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Abstract
We study the parameterized control complexity of fallback voting, a voting system that
combines preference-based with approval voting. Electoral control is one of many different
ways for an external agent to tamper with the outcome of an election. We show that adding and
deleting candidates in fallback voting are W[2]-hard for both the constructive and destructive
case, parameterized by the amount of action taken by the external agent. Furthermore, we
show that adding and deleting voters in fallback voting are W[2]-hard for the constructive case,
parameterized by the amount of action taken by the external agent, and are in FPT for the
destructive case.
1 Introduction
The study of algorithmic issues related to voting systems has moved front-and-center in contem-
porary computer science. Google is basically an algorithmic engine (plus targeted advertising) that
collates ranking information (votes) mined from series-of-clicks and other data, tuned by further
heuristics. Essentially, every Google query result is the outcome of an algorithmic election con-
cerning the relevance of websites to the query.
Similar issues arise throughout science, in the current era of vastly expanded pools of raw infor-
mation. Many of these issues can be thought of as specialized Google-style queries: for example,
“which genes in the database(s) seem to be most relevant to this new information ...?”
In all areas of science, government and industry, the collation of information, and prioritization
of allied strategic options, has moved front-and-center both tactically and strategically.
This general situation has profoundly stimulated, and drawn upon, a mathematical subject that
used to be a bit of a backwater, concerned with “ideal” voting systems and so forth. But now (and
forever more) rapid and frequent, algorithmically-powered, elections about relevant information are
becoming a cornerstone of civilization.
∗This work was supported in part by the DFG under grants RO 1202/12-1 (within the European Science Foundation’s
EUROCORES program LogICCC: “Computational Foundations of Social Choice”) and RO 1202/11-1. Work done in
part while the first author was visiting the University of Newcastle.
†URL: ccc.cs.uni-duesseldorf.de/˜erdelyi. Heinrich-Heine-Universita¨t Du¨sseldorf, Institut fu¨r Informatik, 40225
Du¨sseldorf, Germany.
‡URL: http://mrfellows.net/. University of Newcastle, Callahan, NSW Australia 2308.
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As in (almost) all things algorithmic, rich questions inevitably arise about the tractability of
the desired information-election processes, and their susceptibility to manipulation (or primary data
error). This paper is about this context of research.
2 Preliminaries
Given the many information-resolution contexts in which voting systems are relevant, presenting
different characteristics and challenges, it is an important resource that various voting systems have
been proposed. These are now being vigorously investigated in regards algorithms and complex-
ity issues of their strengths and weaknesses in various applied contexts. There are many papers
regarding the complexity-theoretic aspects of the many different ways of changing the outcome of
an election, like manipulation [BTT89, BO91, CSL07, HH07, FHHR09b], where a group of voters
cast their votes strategically, bribery [FHH09, FHHR09a], where an external agents bribes a group
of voters in order to change their votes, and control [BTT92, HHR07, FHHR09a, HHR09, ENR09,
FHHR09b, EPR10], where an external agent—which is referred to as “The Chair”—changes the
structure of the election (for example, by adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters).
In this paper, we are concerned with control issues for the relatively recently introduced voting
system of fallback voting (FV, for short) [BS09]. Fallback voting is the natural voting system that
currently has the most resistances (i.e., makes the chair’s task hard) for control attacks [EPR10]. We
investigate the issues in the framework parameterized complexity. Many voting systems present NP-
hard algorithmic challenges. Parameterized complexity is a particularly appropriate framework in
many contexts of voting systems because it is concerned with exact results that exploit the structure
of input distributions. It is not appropriate in political contexts, for example, to algorithmically
determine a winner “approximately”.
In this section, we explicate voting systems in general, fallback voting in particular, parameter-
ized complexity theory, and some graph theory that we will use.
2.1 Elections and Electoral Control
An election (C,V ) consists of a finite set of candidates C and a finite collection of voters V who
express their preferences over the candidates in C, and distinct voters can have the same prefer-
ences. A voting system is a set of rules determining the winners of an election. In our paper we only
consider the unique-winner model, where we want to have exactly one winner at the time. Votes
can be represented in different ways, depending on the voting system used. One widely-used repre-
sentations of votes is via preference rankings. In this case each voter has to specify a tie-free linear
ordering of all candidates. Such voting systems are for example Condorcet, Borda count, plurality
or veto; see, e.g., [BF02]. Approval voting, introduced by Brams and Fishburn [BF78, BF83] is not
a preference based voting system. In approval voting each voter has to vote “yes” or “no” for each
candidate and the candidates with the most “yes” votes are the winners of the election. Clearly,
approval voting completely ignores preference rankings.
Brams and Sanver [BS09] introduced two voting systems that combine preference-based with
approval voting. One of these systems is fallback voting.
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Definition 2.1 ([BS09]). Let (C,V ) be an election. Every voter v ∈V has to divide the set of candi-
dates C into two subsets Sv ⊆C indicating that v approves of all candidates in Sv and disapproves
of all candidates in C−Sv. Sv is called v’s approval strategy. In addition, each voter v ∈V provides
also a tie-free linear ordering of all candidates in Sv.
Representation of votes: Let Sv = {c1,c2, . . . ,ck} for a voter v who ranks the candidates in Sv
as follows. c1 > c2 > · · ·> ck, where c1 is v’s most preferred candidate and ck is v’s least preferred
candidate. We denote the vote v by
c1 c2 · · · ck | C−Sv,
where the approved candidates to the left of the approval line are ranked from left to the right and the
disapproved candidates to the right of the approval line are not ranked and written as a set C−Sv.
In our constructions, we sometimes also insert a subset B ⊆C into such approval strategies, where
we assume some arbitrary, fixed order of the candidates in B (e.g., “ c1 B | (C−B−{c1}) ”
means that c1 and all b ∈ B are approved of, while the rest of the candidates are disapproved of).
Let score(C,V )(c) = ‖{v ∈V | c ∈ Sv}‖ denote the number of voters who approve of candidate c,
and let scorei(C,V )(c) be the level i score of c in (C,V ), which is the number of c’s approvals when
ranked between the (inclusively) first and ith position.
Winner determination:
1. On the first level, only the highest ranked approved candidates (if they exist) are considered
in each voters’ approval strategy. If there is a candidate c ∈C with score1(C,V )(c)> ‖V‖/2 (i.e.,
c ∈C has a strict majority of approvals on this level), then c is the (unique) level 1 FV winner
of the election, and the procedure stops.
2. If there is no level 1 winner, we ”fall back“ to the second level, where the two highest ranked
approved candidates (if they exist) are considered in each voters’ approval strategy. If there
is exactly one candidate c ∈ C with score2(C,V )(c) > ‖V‖/2, then c is the (unique) level 2 FV
winner of the election, and the procedure stops. If there are at least two such candidates, then
every candidate with the highest level 2 score is a level 2 FV winner of the election, and the
procedure stops.
3. If we haven’t found a level 1 or level 2 FV winner, we in this way continue level by level until
there is at least one candidate c ∈C on a level i with scorei(C,V )(c)> ‖V‖/2, If there is only one
such candidate, he or she is the (unique) level i FV winner of the election, and the procedure
stops. If there are at least two such candidates, then every candidate with the highest level i
score is a level i FV winner of the election, and the procedure stops.
4. If for no i≤ ‖C‖ there is a level i FV winner, every candidate with the highest score(C,V )(c) is
a FV winner of (C,V ) by score.
We now formally define the computational problems that we study in our paper. We consider
two different control types. In a constructive control scenario, introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey,
and Trick [BTT92], the chair seeks to make his or her favourite candidate win the election. In a
destructive control scenario, introduced by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07],
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the chair’s goal is to prevent a despised candidate from winning the election. We will only state the
constructive cases. The questions in the destructive cases can be asked similarly with the difference
that we want the distinguished candidate not to be a unique winner.
We first define control via adding a limited number of candidates.
Name Control by Adding a Limited Number of Candidates.
Instance An election (C ∪D,V ), where C is the set of qualified candidates and D is the set of
spoiler candidates, a designated candidate c ∈C, and a positive integer k.
Parameter k.
Question Is it possible to choose a subset D′ ⊆ D with ||D′|| ≤ k such that c is the unique winner
of election (C∪D′,V )?
In the following control scenario, the chair seeks to reach his or her goal by deleting (up to a
given number of) candidates.
Name Control by Deleting Candidates.
Instance An election (C,V ), a designated candidate c ∈C, and a positive integer k.
Parameter k.
Question Is it possible to delete up to k candidates (other than c) from C such that c is the unique
winner of the resulting election?
Turning to voter control, we first specify the problem control by adding voters.
Name Control by Adding Voters.
Instance An election (C,V ∪W ), where V is the set of registered voters and W is the set of unreg-
istered voters, a designated candidate c ∈C, and a positive integer k.
Parameter k.
Question Is it possible to choose a subset W ′ ⊆W with ||W ′|| ≤ k such that c is the unique winner
of election (C,V ∪W ′)?
Finally, the last problem we consider, control by deleting voters.
Name Control by Deleting Voters.
Instance An election (C,V ), a designated candidate c ∈C, and a positive integer k.
Parameter k.
Question Is it possible to delete up to k voters from V such that c is the unique winner of the
resulting election?
The above defined problems are all natural problems, see the discussions in [BEH+09, BTT92,
HHR07, FHHR09a, HHR09].
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2.2 Parameterized Complexity
The theory of parameterized complexity offers toolkits for two tasks: (1) the fine-grained analysis of
the sources of the computational complexity of NP-hard problems, according to secondary measure-
ments (the parameter) of problem inputs (apart from the overall input size n), and (2) algorithmic
methods for exploiting parameters that contribute favorably to problem complexity. Formally, a
parameterized decision problem is a language L ⊆ Σ∗×N. L is fixed-parameter tractable (FPT)
if and only if it can be determined, for input (x,k) of size n = |(x,k)|, whether (x,k) ∈ L in time
O( f (k)nc). This central idea of parameterized complexity supports a notion of FPT-reducibility that
exposes evidence of likely parameterized intractability, through parameterized reducibility from
problems that are hard or complete for intractable parameterized classes. The main hierarchy of
parameterized complexity classes is
FPT ⊆W [1]⊆W [2]⊆ ·· · ⊆W [P]⊆ XP.
W [1] is a strong analog of NP, as the k-Step Halting Problem for Nondeterministic Turing Machines
is complete for W [1]. The k-Clique problem is complete for W [1], and the parameterized Domi-
nating Set problem is complete for W [2]. See the Downey-Fellows [DF99] monograph for further
background.
2.3 Graphs
Many problems proven to be W[2]-hard are derived from problems concerning graphs. We will
prove W[2]-hardness via parameterized reduction from the problem Dominating Set, which was
proved to be W[2]-complete by Downey and Fellows [DF99]. Before the formal definition of the
Dominating Set problem, we first have to present some basic notions from graph theory.
An undirected graph G is a pair G = (V,E), where V = {v1, . . . ,vn} is a finite (nonempty) set
of vertices and E = {{vi,v j}| 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} is the set of edges.1 Any two vertices connected by
an edge are called adjacent. The vertices adjacent to a vertex v are called the neighbours of v, and
the set of all neighbours of v is denoted by N[v] (i.e., N[v] = {u ∈ V | {u,v} ∈ E}). The closed
neighbourhood of v is defined as Nc[v] = N[v]∪{v}. The parameterized version of Dominating Set
is defined as follows.
Name Dominating Set.
Instance A graph G = (V,E), where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges.
Parameter A positive integer k.
Question Does G have a dominating set of size k (i.e., a subset V ′ ⊆V with ||V ′|| ≤ k such that for
all u ∈V −V ′ there is a v ∈V ′ such that {u,v} ∈ E)?
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Classical Complexity Parameterized Complexity
Control by Constructive Destructive Constructive Destructive
Adding a Limited Number of Candidates NP-compl. NP-compl. W[2]-hard W[2]-hard
Deleting Candidates NP-compl. NP-compl. W[2]-hard W[2]-hard
Adding Voters NP-compl. P W[2]-hard (FPT)
Deleting Voters NP-compl. P W[2]-hard (FPT)
Table 1: Overview of results. The classical results are due to Erde´lyi et al. [ER10]. Results new to
this paper are in boldface.
3 Results
Table 1 shows the results on the control complexity of fallback voting due to Erde´lyi et al. [ER10]
and the new results on the parameterized control complexity of fallback voting. The FPT results
in Table 1 are in parenthesis because these two results are trivially inherited from the classical P
results.
In all of our results we will prove W[2]-hardness by parameterized reduction from the W[2]-
complete problem Dominating Set defined in Section 2.3. In these six proofs we will always start
from a given Dominating Set instance (G = (B,E),k), where B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bn} is the set of ver-
tices, E the set of edges in graph G, and k ≤ n is a positive integer. In the following constructions,
the set of candidates will always contain the set B which means that for each vertex bi ∈ B we will
have a candidate bi in our election. We will also refer to candidate set Nc[bi], which is the set of
candidates corresponding to the vertices in G that are in Nc[bi].
3.1 Candidate Control
Theorem 3.1. Both constructive and destructive control by adding candidates in fallback voting
are W[2]-hard.
Proof. We first prove W[2]-hardness to constructive control by adding candidates. Let (G =
(B,E),k) be a given instance of Dominating Set as described above. Define the election
(C,V ), where C = {c,w} ∪ B ∪ X ∪ Y ∪ Z with X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn−1}, Y = {y1,y2, . . . ,yn−2},
Z = {z1,z2, . . . ,zn−1} is the set of candidates, w is the distinguished candidate, and V is the fol-
lowing collection of 2n+1 voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
Nc[bi] X c | (B−Nc[bi])∪Y ∪Z∪{w}.
2. There are n voters of the form:
Y c w | B∪X ∪Z.
1In this paper we will use the symbol V strictly for voters. From the next section on, we will use the symbol B instead
of V for the set of vertices in a graph G.
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3. There is one voter of the form:
Z w | B∪X ∪Y ∪{c}.
Note that candidate w is not the unique winner of the election (C−B,V ), since only candidates
c and w have a strict majority of approvals, w gets only approvals on level n, and scoren(C−B,V)(w) =
n+ 1 < 2n = scoren(C−B,V)(c) thus, c is the unique FV winner of the election (C−B,V ). Now, let
C−B be the set of qualified candidates and let B be the set of spoiler candidates.
We claim that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if w can be made a unique FV winner
by adding at most k candidates.
From left to right: Suppose G has a dominating set of size k. Add the corresponding candidates
to the election. Now candidate c gets pushed at least one position to the right in each of the n votes
in the first voter group. Thus, candidate w is the unique level n FV winner of the election, since w
is the only candidate on level n with a strict majority of approvals.
From right to left: Suppose w can be made a unique FV winner by adding at most k candidates
denoted by B′. By adding candidates from candidate set B, only votes in voter group 1 are changed.
Note that candidate c has already n approvals on level n− 1 in voter group 2 thus, c can not have
any more approvals on level n (else, scoren((C−B)∪B′,V )(c) ≥ n+1 so, c would tie or beat w on level
n). This is possible only if candidate c is pushed in all votes in voter group 1 at least one position to
the right. This, however, is possible only if G has a dominating set of size k.
For the W[2]-hardness proof in the destructive case, we have to do minor changes to the con-
struction, and we will change the roles of candidates c and w. Let (G = (B,E),k) be a given instance
of Dominating Set as described above. Define the election (C,V ), where C = {c,w}∪B∪X ∪Y ∪Z
with X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn−1}, Y = {y1,y2, . . . ,yn−2}, Z = {z1,z2, . . . ,zn−2} is the set of candidates, c
is the distinguished candidate, and V is the following collection of 2n+1 voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
Nc[bi] X c | (B−Nc[bi])∪Y ∪Z∪{w}.
2. There are n voters of the form:
Y c w | B∪X ∪Z.
3. There is one voter of the form:
Z w c | B∪X ∪Y.
Note that again only candidates c and w have strict majority of approvals in election (C−B,V ),
both reach the strict majority on level n with scoren(C−B,V )(w) = n+ 1 < 2n+ 1 = scoren(C−B,V)(c)
thus, c is the unique FV winner of the election (C−B,V). Again, let C−B be the set of qualified
candidates and let B be the set of spoiler candidates.
We claim that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if c can be prevented from being a
unique FV winner by adding at most k candidates.
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From left to right: Suppose G has a dominating set B′ of size k. Add the corresponding candi-
dates to the election. Now candidate c gets pushed at least one position to the right in each of the
n votes in the first voter group. Thus, on level n− 1 none of the candidates has a strict majority
of approvals, and scoren(C∪B′,V )(c) = n+1 = score
n
(C∪B′,V )(w), i.e., both candidates c and w reach a
strict majority of approvals on level n, and since their level n score is equal, c is not the unique FV
winner of the election anymore.
From right to left: Suppose c can be prevented of being a unique FV winner by adding at most k
candidates denoted by B′. By adding candidates from candidate set B, only votes in voter group 1 are
changed. Note that candidate c has already n+1 approvals until level n (including level n) in voter
groups 2 and 3 thus, c can not have any more approvals on level n (else, scoren((C−B)∪B′,V )(c)≥ n+2
so, c would still be the unique level n FV winner of the election). This is possible only if candidate
c is pushed in all votes in voter group 1 at least one position to the right. This, however, is possible
only if G has a dominating set of size k. ❑
Theorem 3.2. Both constructive and destructive control by deleting candidates in fallback voting
are W[2]-hard.
Proof. We will start with the destructive case. Let (G = (B,E),k) be a given instance
of Dominating Set. Define the election (C,V ), where C = {c,w} ∪ B ∪ X ∪ Y ∪ Z with X =
{x1,x2, . . . ,xn2−∑ni=1 ||Nc [bi]||}, Y = {y1,y2, . . . ,yn−1}, Z = {z1,z2, . . . ,zn−2} is the set of candidates,
c is the distinguished candidate, and V is the following collection of 2n+1 voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
Nc[bi] Xi w | (B−Nc[bi])∪ (X −Xi)∪Y ∪Z∪{c},
where Xi = {x1+(i−1)n−∑i−1j=1 ||Nc [b j ]||, . . . ,xin−∑ij=1 ||Nc [b j ]||}.
2. There are n voters of the form:
Y c | B∪X ∪Z∪{w}.
3. There is one voter of the form:
Z w c | B∪X ∪Y.
Note that candidate c is the unique level n FV winner of the election (C,V ), since only c has a
strict majority of approvals among all candidates on level n.
We claim that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if c can be prevented of being a unique
FV winner by deleting at most k candidates.
From left to right: Suppose G has a dominating set B′ ⊆ B of size k. Delete the corresponding
candidates. Now candidate w gets pushed at least one position to the left in each of the n votes in
the first voter group. Since candidate c gets a strict majority of approvals no earlier than on level
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n and scoren(C−B′,V )(w) = n+ 1 = score
n
(C−B′,V )(c), candidate c is not the unique FV winner of the
resulting election anymore.
From right to left: Suppose c can be prevented of being a unique FV winner of the election
by deleting at most k candidates. Observe that only candidate w can prevent c from winning the
election, since w is the only candidate other than c with a strict majority of approvals. In election
(C,V ), candidate w gets a strict majority of approvals no earlier than on level n+ 1, candidate c
not before level n. Candidate w could only prevent c from winning by getting a strict majority of
approvals no later than on level n. This is possible only if candidate w is pushed in all votes in voter
group 1 at least one position to the left. This, however, is possible only if G has a dominating set of
size k.
For the W[2]-hardness proof in the constructive case, we have to change one voter’s vote in the
above construction, and we will again change the roles of candidates c and w. Let (G = (B,E),k)
be a given instance of Dominating Set. Define the election (C,V ) analogous to the destructive case
above with the difference that the distinguished candidate is now w, and V is the following collection
of 2n+1 voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
Nc[bi] Xi w | (B−Nc[bi])∪ (X −Xi)∪Y ∪Z∪{c},
where Xi = {x1+(i−1)n−∑i−1j=1 ||Nc [b j ]||, . . . ,xin−∑ij=1 ||Nc [b j ]||}.
2. There are n−1 voters of the form:
Y c | B∪X ∪Z∪{w}.
3. There is 1 voter of the form:
(Y −{y1}) c w | B∪X ∪Z∪{y1}.
4. There is one voter of the form:
Z w c | B∪X ∪Y.
Note that candidate c is the unique level n FV winner of the election (C,V ), since only c has a
strict majority of approvals among all candidates on level n.
We claim that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if w can be made a unique FV winner
by deleting at most k candidates.
From left to right: Suppose G has a dominating set B′ ⊆ B of size k. Delete the corresponding
candidates. Now candidate w gets pushed at least one position to the left in each of the n votes in
the first voter group. Since candidate c gets a strict majority of approvals no earlier than on level
n and scoren(C−B′,V )(w) = n+2 > n+1 = score
n
(C−B′,V )(c), candidate w is the unique FV winner of
the resulting election.
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From right to left: Suppose w can be made a unique FV winner of the election by deleting at
most k candidates. Since candidate c already has a strict majority of approvals on level n, w has to
beat c no later than on level n. This is possible only if candidate w is pushed in all votes in voter
group 1 at least one position to the left. This, however, is possible only if G has a dominating set of
size k. ❑
3.2 Voter Control
Theorem 3.3. Constructive control by adding voters in fallback voting is W[2]-hard.
Proof. Let (G = (B,E),k) be a given instance of Dominating Set. Define the election (C,V ∪W ),
where C = B∪{w,x} is the set of candidates, w is the distinguished candidate, and V ∪W is the
following collection of n+ k−1 voters:
1. V is the collection of k−1 registered voters of the form:
x | B∪{w}.
2. W is the collection of unregistered voters, where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter wi of
the form:
(B−Nc[bi]) w | Nc[bi]∪{x}.
Clearly, x is the level 1 FV winner of the election (C,V ).
We claim that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if w can be made a unique FV winner
by adding at most k voters from W .
From left to right: Suppose G has a dominating set B′ of size k. Add the corresponding voters
from set W to the election (i.e., each voter wi if bi ∈ B′). Now there are 2k−1 registered voters, thus
the strict majority is k. Since only candidate w has an overall score of k (all other candidates have
an overall score of less or equal k−1), w is the unique FV winner of the resulting election.
From right to left: Suppose w can be made a unique FV winner by adding at most k voters.
Denote the set of added voters by W ′. Note that score1(C,V∪W ′)(x) = k−1. Since if a candidate has a
strict majority of approvals on level 1, he or she is the unique winner of the election, k−1 can not
be a strict majority. This is only possible, if ||W ′|| ≥ k−1. If ||W ′||= k−1 then score(C,V∪W ′)(w) =
k− 1. In this case w has not a strict majority of approvals, and since score(C,V∪W ′)(w) = k− 1 =
score(C,V∪W ′)(x), candidate w couldn’t be made the unique FV winner of the election. Thus, ||W ′||=
k. Note that score(C,V∪W ′)(w) = k > k− 1 = score(C,V∪W ′)(x) and k is also a strict majority. Since
we could make w the unique FV winner of the election, none of the candidates in B can be approved
of by each voters in W ′, otherwise there would exist a candidate b ∈ B with score(C,V∪W ′)(b) = k
and b would get the strict majority of approvals on a higher level than w (since each voter in W ′
ranks all the candidates in Nc[bi] higher than w). This is only possible if G has a dominating set of
size k. ❑
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Theorem 3.4. Constructive control by deleting voters in fallback voting is W[2]-hard.
Proof. To prove W[2]-hardness, we provide again a reduction from Dominating Set. Let (G =
(B,E),k) be a given instance of Dominating Set. Define the election (C,V ), where C = B∪{w} is
the set of candidates, w is the distinguished candidate, and V is the following collection of 2n+ k
voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter vi of the form:
Nc[bi] | (B−Nc[bi])∪{w}.
2. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form:
(B−Nc[bi]) w | Nc[bi].
3. There are k voters of the form:
| B∪{w}.
Note that there is no unique FV winner in the above election, each candidate ties for first place
by overall score n.
We claim that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if w can be made a unique FV winner
by deleting at most k voters.
From left to right: Suppose G has a dominating set B′ of size k. Delete the corresponding voters
from the first voter group (i.e., each voter vi if bi ∈ B′). Now since there is no candidate with a strict
majority of approvals on any level, and score(bi)≤ n−1 for each bi ∈ B and score(w) = n, w is the
unique FV winner by score of the resulting election.
From right to left: Suppose w can be made a unique FV winner by deleting at most k voters.
Observe that w could only win the election by score, since after deleting k voters who disapprove of
w we have still 2n voters, and the overall score of w is n thus, not a strict majority. However, since
w was made a unique FV winner by deleting at most k voters, w must have a higher overall score
than any other candidate. This is possible only if each of the candidates in B have lost at least one
point. This, however, is possible only if G has a dominating set of size k. ❑
4 Conclusions and Open Questions
In this paper we have studied the parameterized complexity of the control problems for the recently
proposed system of fallback voting, parameterized by the amount of action taken by the chair. In
the case of constructive control, all of the problems are W[2]-hard. A natural question to investigate
is whether these problems remain intractable when parameterized by both the amount of action and
some other measure. We have shown that all four problems of constructive and destructive control
by adding or deleting candidates are hard for W[2]. What is the complexity when the parameter is
both the amount of action and the number of voters? We have also shown that both constructive
control by adding and deleting voters are hard for W[2], and that both destructive control by adding
and deleting voters are in FPT. What is the complexity of constructive control parameterized by
both the amount of action and the number of candidates?
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